By Ian Stovey

China Brief Volume 10, Issue 9

29 April 2010

Although the fundamentals of the Southeast Asia-China partnership remain largely unchanged, over the past year or so there has been a discernable change in tone as both sides confront longstanding as well as new problem areas in their relationship. As the nations of Southeast Asia look toward their giant neighbor to the north, the level of concern regarding the impact of China’s rising regional profile has increased markedly. As a result, Southeast Asian countries have demonstrated a greater willingness to articulate their concerns on the diplomatic front on a range of political, economic and strategic issues, putting China on the defensive and prompting its foreign ministry to take action to deflect criticism. Additionally, some Southeast Asian nations are starting to beef up their armed forces to hedge growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. Conversely, as Beijing looks south, it faces a medley of increasingly serious problems with the three major players in mainland Southeast Asia―Burma (Myanmar), Thailand and Vietnam―which lie on China’s critically important southern periphery. ASEAN-China relations are rife with issues, including controversies associated with the recently launched free trade agreement, the perennial problem of tensions in the South China Sea, negative reaction to Chinese dam-building activities along the upper stretches of the Mekong River, and political strife in Burma and Thailand. Although Chinese leaders try to reassure ASEAN governments that Beijing's intentions are benign, today, Southeast Asians seem much less willing to take these reassurances at face value.

CAFTA Arouses Concern in Indonesia

Southeast Asia-China ties began the year on a relatively upbeat note with the visit of PRC State Councilor Dai Bingguo, who is a leading figure in the formulation of Chinese foreign policy, to the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta on January 22. In his speech, Dai was lavish in his praise for the organization’s development over the past 10 years, noting that ASEAN had become “more influential politically, more competitive economically” and had played “an important and unique role in safeguarding and promoting regional stability, development and cooperation,” the latter a nod to ASEAN’s “leading role” in the development of a regional security architecture [1]. China, Dai pledged, would “deepen political mutual trust” and “increase communication” with ASEAN by establishing a permanent representative office at the Secretariat. Dai juxtaposed his praise for ASEAN by acknowledging China’s enormous economic progress over the past decade, but conceded that this growth might be “somewhat fearful” for other countries. China, the State Councilor reassured his hosts, was not to be feared; Southeast Asia should regard the PRC as a “reliable neighbor and friend,” that seeks neither hegemony nor the expulsion of the United States from Asia.

Dai moved on to spotlight what is likely to be the most significant event of ASEAN-China relations this year: the launch of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) on January 1. First proposed by China in 2001, CAFTA removes barriers on thousands of goods and services between China and the ASEAN countries― Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Brunei in 2010 followed by the less developed economies of Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam in 2015―to create the largest free trade area by population and third largest in trade volume after the European Union and North American Free Trade Area. Dai described the creation of CAFTA as “a major happy event for the China-ASEAN family.” Ironically, however, Dai lauded CAFTA in the one country in Southeast Asia where opposition to the agreement is at its strongest―Indonesia.

CAFTA has long been a source of anxiety for Indonesian manufacturers, who have seen competition from China devastate the textile, garment and footwear industries, and who predict the agreement will swamp the domestic market with Chinese goods, force local enterprises out of business, result in job losses of between one to two million, and exacerbate the trade deficit (in 2009 Indonesia’s trade with China was $4.6 billion in the red) (Jakarta Post, April 19). As CAFTA loomed, Indonesian businessmen and trade associations―many of whom had supported President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s successful re-election in 2009―lobbied the government to renegotiate CAFTA or at least postpone the removal of tariffs on more than 200 items. Although the government remained committed to CAFTA in principle, ministers appeared divided over its potential impact; Trade Minister Mari Pangetsu argued the free trade agreement was good news for Indonesian exports (particularly raw materials) and would attract much needed foreign investment from the PRC; Industry Minister M.S. Hidayat, however, warned of massive job losses in the coming months as CAFTA came into effect (Straits Times, January 20).

Despite Pangetsu’s upbeat assessment, the government was acutely aware of CAFTA’s unpopularity, and sought ways to calm the jitters. In a meeting with PRC Commerce Minister Chen Deming on April 13, Indonesia secured agreements from China to establish a joint working group to settle problems arising from CAFTA’s implementation as well as a commitment from the Chinese to pursue balanced trade (Antara, April 5). In a move to partially offset the trade deficit, Chen also pledged nearly $2 billion in export buyers’ credit to finance infrastructure projects (Straits Times, April 4). A month earlier, the state-owned China Railways Group had secured a $4.8 billion contract to build and operate a coal transportation network in South Sumatra―another indication of China’s growing economic presence in Indonesia (Financial Times, March 25).

Yet it remains to be seen whether these initiatives will assuage the concerns of Indonesia’s business community. If the trade deficit continues to balloon, and job losses eventuate, it raises the prospect of the Indonesian government erecting non-tariff barriers and implementing anti-dumping duties on Chinese goods, measures that could spark a trade war between the two countries. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao was scheduled to visit Indonesia on April 22-23, with trade and investment issues high on the agenda. Yet, Wen postponed his trip due to the Qinghai earthquake on April 14. Just as U.S. President Barack Obama had had to postpone his trip to Indonesia in March due to the passage of health care reform legislation, for Wen, too, domestic exigencies had trumped foreign relations.

While Indonesians have been the most vocal in their complaints about CAFTA, their concerns over the inability of local industries to compete with their Chinese counterparts are shared across Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, ASEAN leaders maintain the hope that the long-term benefits of the agreement will outweigh short-term pain.

Further Tensions in the South China Sea

In his speech at the ASEAN Secretariat, Dai Bingguo made only oblique references to the thorny problem of overlapping sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. He advised that ASEAN and China should “expand common interests and minimize differences” and that, “[p]ending a solution, we must not complicate or even aggravate the issues, for it would consequently affect our overall cooperation.” As far as some of the ASEAN members are concerned―particularly Vietnam―by its actions, it is China that is complicating the dispute, and this has contributed to an uptick in tensions over the past two years [2].

Over the past six months, Vietnam and China continued to cross verbal swords over their competing sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. In late 2009 and early 2010, Hanoi condemned China’s decision to establish local governing bodies in the Paracel Islands (a group of islands 200 miles southeast of Hainan Island, occupied by the PRC in 1974 but still claimed by Vietnam) and develop the archipelago’s tourism industry as a violation of Vietnamese sovereignty (Vietnam News Agency, November 16, 2009; Straits Times, January 5). Hanoi has also been flustered by the increasing frequency with which its fishing vessels have been seized by Chinese authorities in the South China Sea. Vietnamese trawlers were detained in waters near the Paracels on December 7 and 8, March 22 and April 13. China has been vocal in its criticism of “illegal” fishing activities conducted by foreign trawlers and the arrest and alleged mistreatment of Chinese fishermen by the maritime enforcement agencies of other countries [3]. In a bid to enforce its jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea, in early April Beijing announced the dispatch of two large fishery patrol vessels to the Spratly Islands to protect Chinese fishing vessels, the first time it has done so outside the period of its unilateral fishing ban in the sea that usually takes place between May and August (Straits Times, April 5).

In reaction to this string of events, President Nguyen Minh Triet visited one of the Vietnamese occupied atolls in the Spratlys and defiantly declared his country would “not let anyone infringe on our territory, our sea, our islands. We won’t [sic] make concessions, even an inch of ground, to anyone” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, April 2). Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Ta Dung had earlier called on the state-controlled media to better publicize the country’s sovereignty claims and reject “incorrect information” from other countries (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 24, 2010). Vietnamese efforts to fix “incorrect information” included complaints to the National Geographic Society for labeling the Paracels as Chinese territory on its maps, and, more legitimately, an error on a Google map which showed the Vietnamese border town of Lao Cai inside China (VOV News, March 14, 2010; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 22). Thus, at the outset of the Sino-Vietnamese “Year of Friendship” to mark 60 years of diplomatic relations, amity has been in very short supply.

In the first quarter of 2010 there was a modicum of good news concerning attempts by China and ASEAN to manage the South China Sea dispute and ameliorate tensions. Last year, talks between the two sides on drawing up guidelines to implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC)―the 2002 agreement aimed at freezing the status quo and promoting cooperative confidence building measures (CBMs)―stalled due to a disagreement over which countries should participate. ASEAN wanted to sit down with China as a group to discuss the DoC while China’s preference was to talk to the individual ASEAN claimants (Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei) on a bilateral basis (The Nation, October 19, 2009). China, it seems, was worried that Vietnam would attempt to rally fellow ASEAN members to its cause and “gang up” on the PRC in bilateral discussions.

In January 2010, Vietnam took over the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN and was determined to break the deadlock. Within weeks of becoming chair, Vietnam had hosted a meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Danang to build consensus on the way forward―a consensus that has been sorely lacking in ASEAN over the past few years. ASEAN leaders attended a summit meeting in Hanoi in April, and while the final communiqué made no reference to the dispute, at a post-summit press conference, Prime Minister Nguyen announced that ASEAN and Chinese officials had agreed to hold meetings to “discuss solutions to push the implementation of the DoC,” suggesting that China had finally agreed to meet with ASEAN as a group (DPA, April 9). At the first of these meetings in Hanoi on April 16, the two sides reportedly discussed ways to operationalize CBMs outlined in the DoC. Concrete proposals will likely be considered at the ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting later this year (Vietnam News Agency, April 17).

As ASEAN and China dither over implementing the 8-year-old DoC, the military balance of power is quickly shifting in China’s favor, putting the Southeast Asian disputants at a disadvantage and rendering the status quo unsustainable. In particular the rapid modernization of China’s navy has become a source of anxiety in some of the capitals of Southeast Asia. Over the past decade, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has put into service a slew of modern submarines, destroyers, frigates, amphibious landing ships and patrol vessels, and this has considerably strengthened Beijing’s hand in the South China Sea. The navy and maritime law enforcement agencies have increased the frequency of their “presence missions” in contested waters, and, given their improved airborne early warning control and aerial refueling capabilities, the PLA can now perform extended air operations over the South China Sea. According to The South China Morning Post, the frequency, scope and sophistication of Chinese military exercises in the South China Sea increased markedly in 2010 (SCMP, April 20). If present assessments are correct, China will commission an aircraft carrier in 2012―the 67,000-ton ex-Soviet carrier Varyag currently being retrofitted in Dalian―which is likely to be home ported at the Sanya Naval Base on Hainan Island [4]. The Varyag will provide the PLAN with organic air cover in the South China Sea, a potential game changer in the territorial dispute.

The strategic implications of China’s rapid military build-up have not been lost on Southeast Asians, who have become less reticent about airing their concerns. In March, for instance, at a meeting of the ASEAN-China Defense and Security Dialogue in Beijing, PLA officials were pointedly asked by a delegate from the Philippines what guarantees the PRC could give that its armed forces would not be used aggressively. In response, Senior Colonel Chen Zhou of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences voiced the standard line that the development of the PLAN was to safeguard China’s maritime interests and would not be used for power projection purposes in pursuit of hegemony (Xinhua News Agency, April 1).

Southeast Asians are not only voicing their concerns, but also taking more concrete actions, including strengthening their naval capabilities. In 2009 Malaysia took delivery of two Scorpene-class submarines that will be based in Sabah near to the disputed Spratly Islands, while reports suggest that in December Vietnam placed an order with Russia for 6 ultra-quiet Kilo-class submarines to defend its territorial claims in the South China Sea. On the sidelines of conferences in Southeast Asia, Chinese scholars and military officers have described these acquisitions as “destabilizing,” an incredible assertion considering that the PLAN now operates 60 submarines.

Since the early 2000s, China, through its diplomatic “charm offensive,” has attempted to convince ASEAN leaders that its rising power presents an economic opportunity rather than a strategic threat. As China’s increasing economic penetration of the region brings problems, and as the PLA grows in strength however, Southeast Asians have become more aware of the gap between rhetoric and reality. As a result, China’s platitudes are wearing thin.

Notes

1. Address by H.E. Dai Bingguo, State Councilor, The People’s Republic of China, at the ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, January 22, 2010.
2. Clive Schofield and Ian Storey, The South China Sea Dispute: Increasing Stakes and Rising Tensions, James town Foundation, November 2009.
3. Robert Sutter, “China-Southeast Asia Relations: Myanmar, South China Sea Issues,” Comparative Connections: A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations (October 2009).
4. Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander U.S. Pacific Command before the House Armed Services Committee on Recent Security Developments Involving China, January 13, 2010.

[Part I of this two-part series examines Southeast Asian concerns over China’s economic role and recent moves in the South China Sea; Part II will examine problem areas in China’s relations with the countries of mainland Southeast Asia.]

By Sophie Quinn-Judge

29 April 2010

Opendemocracy.net

In 2009, Vietnam’s relationship with China suddenly became a public problem again. By presenting a claim to 80% of the South China Sea to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in May, China formalised territorial ambitions that previously had no sanction under international law. This claim puts the Vietnamese into an awkward position: either they have to accept Chinese dominance of what Vietnam calls “the Eastern Sea”, bordering their long coastline, or they have to engage in an open conflict with their powerful neighbour, something the government in Hanoi would prefer to avoid. But the worldwide Vietnamese community could make backing down a costly choice.

Since the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989 and the subsequent UN-brokered election there, Vietnam and China had settled into a comfortable friendship. The bitter standoff between the two nations, which hit its nadir with a short, destructive Chinese attack in February 1979, was forgotten. Off-the-record, Vietnamese diplomats would remark that they had to be careful to avoid offending their northern neighbour by becoming too friendly with the United States. Such talk was not understood, however, as a desire to move away from China, but as part of the foreign policy of “more friends, fewer enemies.” A broad spectrum of international ties has long been the goal of a reforming Vietnam, rushing to integrate itself into the global economy.

But after two decades of accommodation, the growing power of China is forcing Vietnam to face up to some hard choices. The situation is especially complicated for the ruling Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), which since the terminal crisis of eastern-European communism in 1989, has identified closely with the policies of the Chinese party: rapid economic reform combined with a communist-party monopoly on political life and state institutions.

Now, as China pressures Vietnam to accept its control of the South China Sea, the Vietnamese party is being forced to admit that the two nations have conflicting interests in a number of areas. One of these areas is access to local resources, such as the waters of the Mekong River. The flow of the water reaching the Vietnamese delta has dropped markedly in the past ten years, as China has constructed a series of hydroelectric dams upriver. The threat to the Mekong could become a matter of life and death for many south Vietnamese. But at the moment the biggest conflict between China and Vietnam concerns access to the fish, oil and gas found in and under the South China Sea.

An underground spark

Popular alarm about China’s role in Vietnam bubbled to the surface in 2009 in connection with a controversial mining venture, on dry land. The party announced an agreement that would allow China to mine and process bauxite in the central-highlands region. What was originally announced as a boost to the Vietnamese economy soon began to appear as a long-term danger: the Chinese let it be known that they would be bringing in their own workers to run the project, raising the spectre of a permanent Chinese settlement in this strategically sensitive area. It turned out that there would be few jobs for Vietnamese workers.

Moreover, there was no sign of an environmental-impact statement – a crucial element in that it is well known that bauxite mining leaves behind a scarred landscape and produces effluents that pollute farmland and water sources. By the late spring, 139 Vietnamese intellectuals had signed a petition requesting that the government rescind the agreement on bauxite production. Many overseas Vietnamese also appended their names to the petition, as did a number of high-ranking military men. One of the leading figures opposing the bauxite project was General Vo Nguyen Giap, one of the last surviving leaders of the revolutionary era, who still possesses enough moral credibility to be an influential critic when he sees the party straying off course issues (see David G Marr, “Vibrations from the north”, Inside Story, 31 August 2009).

The word circulating in Hanoi in summer 2009 was that a number of generals (the rumour said thirty) had been retired early, as retribution for their opposition to the bauxite project. The mining plan was then discussed in the national assembly, and within three days most dissenting deputies had been persuaded to withdraw their opposition. By March 2010 the project was in the early phase of construction, and local-government officials were assuring the Vietnamese press (a few journalists still dared to ask questions) that the environmental impact would be closely monitored. The Chinese role in the project was barely mentioned in these press reports. It has been rumoured that at least one of the party leaders received a Chinese payoff for supporting the project. In any event, the party’s handling of the bauxite issue suggests that it has broad support from Vietnam’s most powerful men.

A contested claim

This affair on its own would not be enough to upset Vietnamese-Chinese relations for long, but it is symptomatic of larger questions. What is shifting the balance in the two states’ relations is China’s growing economic and military clout. China’s unilateral claim to the maritime territory within a “u-shaped line” scooping down to the north of Borneo demonstrates confidence that it can now defend what it considers its sphere of influence. Recently China has started to refer to the South China Sea as one of its core interests, on a par with Taiwan and Tibet.

In this case Beijing bases its claim on possession of two island groups: the Paracels and Spratlys, which would enable it in turn to invoke the 200 nautical-miles exclusive economic zone approved by the United Nations. Many of these scattered islands are little more than sandbars, and sovereignty over them is contested by several other states; but were China able to establish ownership, this would enable control of key shipping-lanes and of an area believed to be rich in oil and natural gas. Some observers believe, however, that the Chinese may now have overplayed their hand by raising the stakes in this territorial dispute.

Vietnam has been attempting to defend its own claim to islands in the Paracel and Spratly groups since the country reunified in 1976, but with little success. On the contrary, Hanoi has conceded some of its territorial waters to China in a border agreement on the Gulf of Tonkin, and even agreed to joint naval patrolling in 2006. But despite these concessions and publicly cordial relations, the Chinese have since May 2009 been ramming or seizing Vietnamese fishing-boats that stray into what they claim as their zone, which the Vietnamese consider their traditional fishing grounds. Fishermen have been held hostage or their catch of fish confiscated, to considerable public outrage in Vietnam.

China forced the south Vietnamese garrison in the Paracels out of the archipelago in 1974, as the Vietnam war was winding down. No one raised an eyebrow at the time, as the United States was preoccupied by the Soviet threat in the Pacific. Vietnam’s historical claim to these islands goes back to at least the early years of the Nguyen family’s rule (from 1802); emperors Gia Long (r. 1802-20) and Minh Mang (r. 1820-41) sent expeditions to chart the waters around the islands, which appear as Vietnamese possessions on maps drawn by early French missionaries. The claim also reflects the fact that fishermen from central Vietnam have long exploited the sea resources here and conducted salvage operations in the treacherous waters. The French had sovereignty over these territories until the second world war, and South Vietnam inherited this claim.

Even with the purchase of six kilo-class diesel submarines from Russia, there is no chance that Vietnam could win a naval confrontation with China. And the Vietnamese know that enlarging their military will not help build confidence among other nations in the region. Instead they are banking on their chairmanship of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (Asean) in 2010 to build a multilateral consensus to support their call for negotiations on sharing the resources of the South China Sea. (The Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia also have maritime claims which conflict with China’s territorial ambitions.) (see Edward Wong, “Vietnam Enlists Allies to Stave Off China’s Reach”, New York Times, 4 February 2010).

A declaration of 2002 on a code of conduct signed by Asean and China, on issues such as environmental protection and search-and-rescue protocols, may be a model for future negotiations. But this agreement has no legal force and discussions to extend its coverage have stalled in recent years. What could promote a breakthrough in negotiations with China would be the agreement of the US and Japan to join in a multilateral solution.

A national question

There is speculation within Vietnam that some party leaders would rather see Vietnam turned into “another province of China” than risk undermining the power of the VCP by establishing closer ties with Washington. Yet threats to territorial integrity are now taken more seriously in Hanoi than they were in the mid-2000s.

The four major threats to the nation as designated by the programme being prepared for the next party congress in 2011 are 1) economic backwardness, 2)hostile forces and peaceful evolution, 3) territorial disputes and 4) global issues related to food security, energy security and global warming. This list demonstrates the increasing sophistication of Hanoi’s diplomacy, in spite of the fact that fear of “peaceful evolution” - code for the undermining of communist values by contact with the west - is still high on the danger-list (see “Vietnam: the necessary voices”, 29 April 2007).

By now it must be clear to the Vietnamese leadership that more concessions to China will erode the confidence of key strata of the population, including both intellectuals and segments of the military. And despite (or perhaps because) of tight controls on the press and internet, public confidence in government information is not as strong as it used to be. Everything, from figures showing inflation to be under control to optimistic reports on the progress of environmental protection, is received sceptically by newspaper-readers. If the public comes to believe that the communist party, which presents itself as the guardian of national independence, can no longer protect the nation’s key interests, then its legitimacy will be increasingly questioned.

By Peter J Brown

Asia Times Online

4 March 2010

Japan's Okinotori Island, which has a Tokyo postal address even though it lies roughly 1,770 kilometers south of the capital and it is actually a pair of tiny islets, has become a bone of contention for China.

Among other things, China refuses to grant it island status, and refers to it instead as an atoll, reef or simply a rock. By doing so, China hopes to throttle back Japan's plan to create an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) there. The dispute over Okinotori, which Japan calls Okinotorishima, persists because it involves strategic concerns and rights to undersea resources over an area that is roughly equivalent to the entire land mass of the four main Japanese islands.

At an undersea resource development conference hosted by Kyushu University last December that was attended by experts from China, Japan and South Korea and elsewhere, the cobalt-rich manganese crusts around Okinotori were highlighted. Although "rich natural resources" in the area are frequently mentioned as well by China, details are lacking.

At the East Asian Seas Congress in Manila last November, Japan's submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in March 2009 was discussed. This document addressed seven regions between Japan and the Philippines comprising 740,000 square kilometers. Besides potential overlapping claims with the United States and the Republic of Palau - not involving Okinotori - Japan is confronted by both China and the Republic of Korea (South Korea), which filed complaints last year with the CLCS concerning Japan's actions on Okinotori. [1]

When the Democratic Party of Japan-led government headed by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama came to power last year, it wasted no time in declaring that Japan is allocating US$7 million in 2010 to create a facility on Okinotori in a bid to firmly establish yet another foothold there. This may seem like a large sum, but it represents less than 3% of the total amount spent thus far by Japan to sustain this remote island. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been allocated by the Japanese over the past two decades.

Japan now finds itself indebted to Vietnam, albeit indirectly. Vietnam is exposing curious contradictions that it has detected in China's case against Japan in this instance.

Vietnam, along with other Southeast Asian nations, has a territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea. Last year, the Vietnamese government submitted a national report on the limits of its continental shelf "which lie 200 nautical miles beyond the country's baselines in the northern part of the East Sea [Vietnam's name for the South China Sea]" to the CLCS. This took place in late August.

Together, Vietnam and Malaysia also presented another joint report to the CLCS on the continental shelves of both countries, "which extend out over 200 nautical miles from their baselines in the southern part of the East Sea".

The Vietnamese national report and the Vietnam-Malaysia joint report preceded the approval by the Japanese Diet (parliament) of a law in 2010 that authorizes the central government - not local government - to manage and control both Okinotori and the even more remote Minamitori Island, southeast of Tokyo - and about 290 kilometers more distant than Okinotori.

While China dismisses all of these actions by Japan as illegal, it is anxiously looking over its shoulder at the emboldened Vietnamese.

"The construction of infrastructure will not change Okinotori Reef's legal position," said China's Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu at a press briefing in January, adding that this violates international maritime law. [2]

Japan claimed Okinotori, also known as Douglas Reef or Parece Vela, in 1931 as part of Ogasawara village in the prefecture of Tokyo, and officially named it Okinotorishima.


"The Japanese claim to an EEZ and continental shelf around Okinotorishima is based on several factors," said Associate Professor Peter Dutton of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College. "First, Japanese scholars claim that Okinotorishima is an island that qualifies under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for an EEZ and continental shelf in that it sustains economic activity, even though it is apparently not much more than 10 square meters in size at high tide.

"This argument has only the most tenuous support under the current state of international law. The Japanese seem to recognize this fact and have set out a second legal basis, namely that Japan has longstanding historic interests in Okinotorishima, the adjacent waters, and the resources of the surrounding seabed. In Japan's view, these interests have consolidated over time into legally protected rights."

China points to Article 121 of UNCLOS, which defines an island as "a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide". China designates it as a rock under the same article - rocks cannot sustain human habitation or economic life - because a rock by itself cannot be used to claim either an EEZ or by extension a continental shelf submerged in a relatively shallow sea.

By acting as if it has legal standing under UNCLOS, China has suddenly opened the door for Vietnam, and Vietnam has seized the opportunity.

The strategic importance of Okinotori cannot go unnoticed as it sits halfway on a line between the huge US military base on the island of Guam and Taiwan. While divergent Chinese and Japanese strategic interests are driving this dispute, China's need to navigate freely is increasing.

"China has staked legal positions that have de-legitimized foreign military operations in a coastal country's EEZ. China's objections to US military activities in its EEZ are based on these legal perspectives," said Dutton. "On the other hand, as China's naval power has grown over the last couple of decades, China's strategy for controlling the outcome of events throughout East Asia in times of crisis has also evolved. During times of crisis, China now has aspirations of challenging outside naval powers for control of the waters between the first and second island chain." (The first island chain encompasses the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea. The second encompasses the Japan Sea, the Philippines Sea and the Indonesia Sea.)

This puts China in an awkward position to say the least.

"To be consistent with its demand that the US cease performing military operations in and above China's EEZ, China would not be able to undertake military operations in the waters of Japan's EEZ surrounding Okinotori. As such, to preserve their own security interests, China refuses to recognize Japan's claim," said Dutton.

Prior to Vietnam's move, the chief objective here for Japan had been to politely ignore China's protests and to ensure that, above all else, Okinotori should not somehow sink beneath the sea.

"There is no change in the nature of the dispute. Japan has been planting coral on Okinotori to secure its status as an 'island', while China keeps criticizing [and asserting that] it is a 'rock', so as not to allow Japan's EEZ," said Yukie Yoshikawa, senior research fellow at the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies in Washington, DC.

Planting coral there is just one of the latest Japanese measures, which have included pouring tons of concrete, at a cost of $280 million, to encase both of the islets, as well as covering them with a titanium net which cost another $50 million.


In 2005, Japan mounted a large address plaque there so that everyone would immediately know on arrival that they had reached "1 Okinotori Island, Ogasawara Village, Tokyo." Soon after this was put in place, Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara was photographed kissing the plaque and waving the Japanese flag over it. He kept his life jacket on at the same time. [4]

As China attempts to convince the rest of Asia that what Japan is now undertaking actually harms its neighbors, Vietnam shakes its head.

"If Japan's efforts succeed, other countries will not be allowed to fish or share other rich natural resources in a region that is currently regarded as international high seas," said Wang Hanling, an expert in maritime affairs and international law at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. "Besides, for some neighbors such as China and the Republic of Korea, the fleets' freedom of navigation along some key routes in the area will also be hampered. That will pose risks to their national security."

In its dealings with Japan, China has even raised the issue of fairness at times, a tactic which must amuse Hanoi.

"Japan's claim over Okinotori, which lies between Taiwan and Guam, is in a strategically important position for Japan's benefit," said Jin Yongming, a researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. "But the move has harmed other countries' navigation interests and marine survey in the sea waters around Okinotori, and is contrary to the principle of fairness." [4]

Why China is beginning to realize that the stance it has adopted here might backfire is becoming increasingly apparent. Vietnam still claims sovereignty over the Paracel Islands - China's Xisha Islands - in the South China Sea, while the Spratlys, or Nansha Islands as China calls, them are claimed by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia.

In early 2009, or perhaps earlier, Vietnam started picking apart the "reefs and islands" argument raised by China supposedly under UNCLOS rules in its case against Japan, and said in effect, "Wait a minute, China, you are arguing the exact opposite regarding our claims in the East Sea."

One minute, argues Vietnam, China asserts that Okinotori cannot have an exclusive economic zone or determine the limits of a continental shelf because it is an atoll, reef or rock and does not have an independent economic life, and the next minute China asserts that so-called "islands" in the East Sea all have independent economic life so they can support a claim to exclusive economic zones and continental shelves of 200 nautical miles covering 80% of the East Sea.

None of this rings true, or not to the extent that it allows China to proceed down the path it is taking. Ownership of the islands in the East Sea is really not central to the outcome because Vietnam contends that "no country can claim up to 80% of the East Sea on the basis of a claim to ownership of these islands". [5]

In other words, look closely and one can detect dozens of little "Okinotoris" dotting the South China Sea. China is just hoping that the rest of the world - at least the rest of the world which has been following China's attempt to derail Japan - will overlook them.

"It seems as though Vietnam is signaling that it would be satisfied with sovereignty over the islands and to leave most of the South China Sea as high seas. The implication of Vietnam's perspective, were Vietnam to consolidate its claims at China's expense, is that most of the South China Sea would remain open for all states to fish and extract seabed resources," said Dutton. "That is not the effect of China's claims over the South China Sea."

At the same time, if China is attempting to counter this clever tactic by Vietnam, it is not doing a very effective job. In fact, China appears to be turning a blind eye to Vietnam here.

"This position presents China with an additional dilemma that it has not yet publicly begun to reconcile," said Dutton.

Beijing's decision to build a luxury resort in the Paracels in the South China Sea has not helped the situation.

"[Vietnam] demanded in early January 2010 that China abandon the project, which [it] said causes tension and further complicates the situation," said Yoshikawa.

Still, when Chen Bingde, chief of the general staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and a member of the Central Military Commission, met with Nguyen Chi Vinh, Vietnam's deputy defense minister, in Beijing in early March, there was no mention of this dispute, not publicly anyway.

China has been diligent in other maritime matters despite any protests elsewhere. Just last month, for example, China finished work on the last of 13 permanent facilities on islands and reefs in the East China Sea as part of another intensive EEZ extension and development process. A new lighthouse at Waikejiao is the latest addition.

"Because Japan and China tend to look at foreign policy in a more relationship-oriented manner - rather than Washington's event-driven policies - if both countries are on good terms, which you can say for now, the Okinotori Island issue will be taken care of so that it does not dampen the relationship," said Yoshikawa.

Japan is not likely to suffer any consequences as it proceeds with its plans on Okinotori.

"I do not see that happening for the foreseeable future as this is a peripheral issue which is more likely to be affected by overall Sino-Japanese relations," said Yoshikawa.

Nevertheless, China has a very good reason for persisting in its efforts here, regardless if it annoys Japan or not.

"There is not much that China can do about Japan's claim, given China's own claims in the South China Sea," said Dutton. "However, China will probably continue to diplomatically object to Japan's claim in order to preserve Chinese freedom of military action in the waters surrounding Okinotori."

Notes: 1.) EAS CONGRESS 2009 HIGHLIGHTS , Nov 24, 2009
2.)Beijing slams Tokyo move on atoll, China Daily, Jan 8, 2010
3.)Japan and China Dispute a Pacific Islet , New York Times, July 10, 2005
4.) Japan atoll expansion 'hurts neighbors', China Daily, Feb 11, 2010
5.) Vietnam delimits its continental shelf in UN report. Vietnamnet, Aug 2009