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By Michael Auslin
Wall Street Journal
20 May 2010
While the world has been focusing on Europe's economic crisis, events in Asia's waters presage a different kind of turbulence. The region's economic strength co-exists with continuing political and security tensions that threaten long-term stability in the region. These tensions increase the pressure on a United States Navy that is facing shrinking budgets and increasing responsibilities.
The current troubles began with the explosion that ripped through a South Korean naval vessel in late March, sinking the ship and taking the lives of 46 sailors. Whether by mine or torpedo, the destruction of ROKS Cheonan was an aggressive act almost certainly perpetrated by North Korea. Without concrete proof, however, Seoul's hands have been tied, and the likelihood of condemning, let alone punishing, Pyongyang for its act of war decrease by the day.
Naval clashes between North and South have been a regular feature of the Korean standoff for the past decades. But the unprovoked sinking of the Cheonan is a major escalation in the North's actions that may well portend even larger clashes—especially if Kim Jong Il feels his navy has escaped scot-free in the murder of dozens of South Korean sailors.
The longer term currents roiling Asia's waters, however, are coming from recent Chinese PLA Navy expeditions and strategic announcements. In early April, Chinese ships set out south and east to expand China's political claims and operational range. In the South China Sea, two Fisheries Administration patrol vessels were dispatched to accompany Chinese private fishing vessels in the Spratly Islands area. Two weeks earlier, Chinese ships seized a Vietnamese fishing vessel near the more northerly Paracels. Even though Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and the Philippines all claim sovereignty over parts of the Spratlys, China has now elevated its claims to almost the entire South China Sea to the level of "core interests," according to reports.
By making the South China Sea into a front-line territorial and strategic issue, Beijing is dramatically raising the stakes in any future confrontation, intentional or otherwise. It is also putting the U.S. Navy on notice that it will be far more present and engaged in the Asian maritime region that the U.S. has patrolled without interference for the past six decades.
To back up its newly expansive claims, China's military and its doctrine are evolving. Its procurement of advanced submarines and land-based fighter aircraft is accompanied by development of antiship ballistic missiles that will increasingly hold U.S. capital ships, such as aircraft carriers, at risk. This capability to deny U.S. and allied forces freedom of action in contested areas, such as the waters around Taiwan, is married to new doctrinal concepts for Chinese maritime force projection.
These new operating philosophies were put on display during Chinese naval exercises in March and April. In the South China Sea, a three-week deployment by elements of the PLA Navy's North Sea Fleet sailed to the contested Spratlys. While there, Chinese land-based aircraft conducted combat training, including mid-air refueling and mock bombing exercises, thus illustrating the joint operations capabilities of the Chinese military.
Simultaneously, to the east a substantial flotilla of 10 PLA Navy vessels, including submarines, guided missile destroyers and corvettes, sailed through the East China Sea. They passed into waters off of Okinawa, then continued down to Japan's southern-most islands, the Okinotori atoll, where, according to Japanese newspapers, they conducted antisubmarine warfare exercises. The Okinotori islands lie between Taiwan and Guam, one of the U.S. military's key forward bases. Thus, the PLA Navy's exercises were a message to U.S. Pacific Command not to take for granted its ability to reach critical points in the western Pacific.
The U.S. is hardly the only country to feel anxiety at China's ability to sail thousands of miles from its shores. While this East Sea Fleet was operating in Japanese territorial waters, ships of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces shadowed it at a safe distance. The Chinese responded by sending helicopters to buzz the Japanese vessels, leading to diplomatic protests from Tokyo.
The Chinese call their new strategy "far sea defense," marking a fundamental shift from the coastal orientation that guided naval doctrine until this decade. In capabilities, strategy and doctrine, the Chinese navy is reflecting the country's global outlook and, most importantly, signaling neighboring states that it will play an expanded role in the region.
Few believe that the PLA Navy yet poses an existential threat to U.S. forces in the Pacific. Its large submarine force, for example, still sticks fairly close to home waters for the most part, while it will be years before any type of effective aircraft carrier operations can be put together.
This has not stopped the new U.S. commander in the Pacific, Admiral Robert Willard, from noting China's "dramatic" advances. More worryingly, Adm. Willard has publicly noted the lack of a trust-based, working relationship between the U.S. and Chinese militaries. When political relations are mistrustful or frosty, there is little leeway to solve problems or control incidents, such as the Chinese harassment of U.S. naval research vessels in early 2009, also in the South China Sea.
The result is a slow ratcheting up of political and security tensions in Asia. Chinese probing is followed by a period of quiet, later broken by new claims and more assertive exercises. Throw in a wildcard like North Korea, which may decide to sink another ship, South Korean or not, and the maritime realm starts to appear decidedly treacherous.
The natural response in the region is to look to the U.S. Navy for the ultimate guarantee of stability. Yet that service has been put on notice by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates that it will have to make do with smaller budgets, possibly fewer aircraft carriers and maybe no next-generation ballistic-missile submarine.
At the very time that China is flexing its maritime muscle, the trend lines are heading in the wrong direction. The U.S. will continue to play its stabilizing role in the western Pacific, but with a more uncertain future and eventually, should any type of conflict break out, with greater risk. That ultimately means more risk for the Asia-Pacific as a whole.
Mr. Auslin, a columnist for WSJ.com, is director of Japan studies at the American Enterprise Institute.
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